From "the Factory of Ideas" (Archive)
Zafer GAZİ - Head of TÜSİAD Foreign Relations Department
After the first ballot of 2005, the second general election in Iraq to be held within the framework of the post-2003 US invasion administrative arragements took place on 7th March 2010.[1] Acoording to preliminary results posted on 29th March, the State of Law list lead by Prime Minister and Shiite-dominated al-Iraqiyye list lead by a former Prime Minister lyad Allawi, but also representing Sunni and Arab nationalists and including the Turkmen front, gained 91 seats, in an election from which many Shiite and Sunni candidates had been barred from participation. The National Iraqi Alliance coalition, an umbrella group of Islamic Shiite parties (without the al-Dawa party) headed by the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ammar al-Hekim and principally incorporating the Sadr movement and another former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, won 70 seats, and the Barzani-Talabani Kurdistan Alliance 43 (all Kurdish groups together won a total of 57 seats) [2]. After overruling objections to the preliminary results in 2 seats won by the Allawi list, the Iraqi Constitutional Court approved the election results as posted on 29th March.
With the easing of tensions arising from the Turkish parliament’s rejection to pass the 1st March 2003 resolution that would have allowed passage of US troops into Iraq through Turkey, prospects of an Ankara-Washington rapprochement on the issue of the new era in Iraq are posited on various factors. The US has a preference for Allawi on account of Prime Minister Maliki and his allies’ links to Iran, their lack of sufficient cooperation on the drawing up of a timetable for US withdrawal, and Iran’s growing influence in Iraq. Turkey, having striven intensively for the inclusion of the Sunnis in the new political system in Iraq, and being highly sensitive on the subject of the territorial integrity of Iraq, also tends to favor the Sunni Allawi – even if not as forthrightly as the US.
It is still not clear whether the Shiite-Kurdish alliance formed after the war in Iraq and the end of the Baathist regime, will last. While the coming to power of Allawi, who enjoys wide support from the Sunni community, would possibly facilitate Sunni integration into the new system, the extent to which the Kurds and the non-secular Iran-influenced Shiite groups will endorse this, remains an open question. The attention of both groups may well have been drawn to the US’s objective of withdrawing its forces except for 50,000 non-combat troops from 1st September 2010 and withdrawing totally from Iraq in 2011. And in a nation like Iraq with such a weak sense of national unity, in the event that Allawi fails to form a coalition and Maliki then becomes Prime Minister, forming a government with the National Iraqi Alliance in line with recent developments[3], it is possible to envisage a sharpening of sectarian divisions and the subsequent break-up of Allawi’s heterogeneous block that draws support across sectarian divides.
While the successful formation of an Allawi government that is relatively secular, heterogeneous in terms of the sectarian make-up of its electoral base, and implicitly supported by Turkey, would clearly represent a fresh step towards political stability and renewal in an Iraq that has not managed to overcome sectarian tensions in recent years, it is also evident that the process will come under the influence of various dynamics in the Middle East region. In this context, if tough international sanctions directed against its nuclear program are implemented against Iran, the issue of whether the reaction of Iran-influenced Islamist Shiite groups will reach the point of threatening the continuity of the country’s post-war model of government, will be an important variable. In any event, it will not be easy for the Shiites to step back from the dominance they have won in recent years and welcome the inclusion of Sunnis in the system.
By the same token, policies that will be developed vis-à-vis divergences and convergences of views between Turkey and the US by the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan, which has made significant political gains in the post-war period and recently taken a more wary stance on issues such as political relations with Turkey and Kirkuk, will be important factors. It is thought that the Iraqi Kurdistan administration will favor the government composition that makes the least investment in strengthening central government in the country. In this region, the pursuit of a more flexible policy is anticipated from the Kurdistan Alliance, who, especially in Kirkuk, lost votes to al-Iraqiyye and whose political monopoly was partially shaken by the Movement for Change (Gorran). On the other hand, the presence of figures in the al-Iraqiyye coalition who were close to the old Baathist regime will hinder political initiatives by the Kurds in that direction.
With the certification of the election results on 1st June, parliament must convene within 15 days; the election in turn of the new Speaker and the President, and the confirmation of the Prime Minister, must take place within a stipulated timetable. Since this duty must first be given to the largest Council of Representatives bloc in parliament, the process of forming a new government is expected to take a long time. The lack of clarity over whether this duty will be given to Allawi or to Maliki, who is closer to bringing the two Shiite blocs in parliament together, makes future events hard to predict and creates uncertainty on how Iraq’s political future will shape up.
In any event, Turkey would benefit from keeping a close eye on the process and developing plans according to different possible government options. Turkey needs to strengthen its relations both with the central Iraqi administration as well as that of Iraqi Kurdistan, and to maintain its capacity to influence the process. In this context, bilateral relations developed within the framework of the Turkey-Iraq High Level Strategic Cooperation Council set up in 2008, Sunni – Shiite dialogue that has been established, as well as the opening of a Turkish Consulate in Erbil in March of this year and the visit to Turkey of Iraqi Kurdistan regional government President Massoud Barzani at the beginning of June after a gap of 6 years, are significant steps.
By such means, sensitivities on the issues of Iraq’s territorial integrity and the way in which a federal structure is implemented, relations between the central government and the Iraqi Kurdistan regional government, oil revenue-sharing and the status of Kirkuk can be directly conveyed, and the possibility of being included in the process increased.
[1] For brief information on blocs and parties that participated in the elections see http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/iraqelection2010/2010/03/20103493048404203.html
[2] For detailed results see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_parliamentary_election,_2010#Final_results
Turkmens won 8 seats in various blocks, 5 of them as the Iraq Turkmen Front, part of the al-Iraqiyye block
[3] In such an event, both groups would have 159 seats, 4 short of an absolute majority. Various moves to form such a coalition were made in March. It is thought that the most important actor in the National Iraqi Alliance, Muqtada al-Sadr, with control of 39 of its 70 seats, would not be enthusiastic about Maliki’s premiership in such a coalition and that this could become an internal bargaining point.
"TÜSİAD Article Series"comprised of articles on current debates. The articles are prepared by TÜSİAD researchers. Opinions expressed belong solely to the author and do not represent the views of TÜSİAD.