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1. Introduction

An unintended and unforeseen consequence of the Arab uprisings in and after 2010/2011 has been the rise of violent Islamist groups as formidable forces in Middle Eastern states that descend into vicious civil wars. These groups do not only establish control over sizeable territories but also manage to attract Muslim foreign fighters including a large number of Turkish citizens. This report discusses the impacts of these regional developments on Turkey with a focus on the evolution of violent forms of Islamist activism.ⁱ A growing number of Turkish citizens have joined the Syrian opposition since 2012. This ominous development is likely to have crucial repercussions for the future of democracy and social peace in Turkey. I identify three factors contributing to the limited but notable appeal of armed struggle among Islamists in Turkey: a) widespread moral outrage in the face of continuing carnage in Syria, b) increasing prestige of Salafi jihadist movements that fight on behalf of Sunni Muslims, and c) foreign policy choices and domestic policy priorities of the ruling AKP that provide an opening for Salafi Jihadist mobilization. This report aims to advance public debate on the subject that deserves systematic attention and policies that would contain Salafi Jihadism in Turkey.

Until recently, the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AK Parti*) successfully cultivated a new image of Turkey as a country where pious Muslims politicians achieved sustainable economic growth and democratic reforms, undertook

initiatives to end a decades-old ethnic insurgency, and pursued an ambitious foreign policy. The initial euphoria characterizing the Arab uprisings bolstered the AKP's attempts to export its model of Muslim governance to the Middle Eastern countries where ossified dictatorships were no longer able to contain popular demands. However, this euphoria proved short-lived, as the uprisings failed to achieve pluralistic and competitive political regimes with the exception of Tunisia. In some countries, such as Egypt, popular fears of instability and polarization prevailed over the desire for political change; authoritarian backlash overwhelmed grassroots activism. In other countries, such as Syria, insurgencies containing powerful radical Islamist groups thrived. Under these regional conditions, Turkey was hard pressed to find natural allies committed to democratic rule and had to enter into tacit alliances with violent actors to pursue its geopolitical goals. These foreign policy choices have had negative implications for societal peace and democratic pluralism in Turkey.

2. Militarization of the Arab Uprisings and the AKP's Foreign Policy

The Arab uprisings that resulted in the fall of four long-serving Arab dictators initially created a golden opportunity for Turkey's ambition to emerge as a role model country in the region. The electoral victories of the Islamist Ennahda in Tunisia and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt in 2011 and 2012 increased the AKP's hopes that popular political demands in the Middle East would give rise to sustainable governments with platforms similar to that of the AKP. Meanwhile, Turkey emerged as a major trading partner in the region, partially thanks to its growing export sector. In these regards, 2012 was the peak year of Turkey's soft power diplomacy in the Middle East. However, even by that

time, there were limits to Turkey's ambitious regional foreign policy. According to a recent study, Turkey had favorable ratings among citizens in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia with Sunni identity and secular political worldviews. Interestingly, Turkey did not necessarily have a more positive image among Arab citizens with pro-democracy views. Anti-Americanism translated into negative views of both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but positive views of the Islamic Republic of Iran that also had strong support among Arabs with Shiite identity and demanding Islamic law. These findings suggest that Turkey's ambition to appeal to the hearts and minds of the Arab publics as the model democratic Muslim republic was heavily constrained by the overlapping sectarian and geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East even in the immediate aftermath of the uprisings.ⁱⁱ

In any case, Turkey's moment of diplomatic charm in the region turned to be ephemeral. The Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt became a victim of a military coup after massive anti- and pro-government popular demonstrations in the summer of 2013. The Islamist Ennahda government in Tunisia did not survive long either, as the parliamentary elections in October 2014 delivered a plurality of seats to the secular Nidaa Tounes party. As the Arab uprisings did not result in the formation of Islamist governments in the Arab countries as expected, a siege mentality based on victimhood has developed among Turkish Islamists.ⁱⁱⁱ Meanwhile, atrocities and widespread human suffering during the Syrian civil war deeply offends Muslim sensibilities and leads to moral outrage especially among Islamist circles in Turkey. The decay of the uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen into vicious and intractable civil wars increased the salience of hard power in the region. In this

regard, Turkey's relative lack of proxies based on dense networks compared to the Islamic Republic of Iran greatly constrains its ability to project power in the region in a time when geopolitical struggles increasingly gained a militarized character.

An unforeseen consequence of this new geopolitical situation is the rise of Salafi Jihadist groups as the most effective forces fighting on behalf of politically marginalized Sunni communities both in Iraq and Syria.^{iv} This puts the AKP government in a difficult position given the tensions between its commitment to the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria and close connections with the Sunnis of Iraq, on the one hand, and the growing Western concerns about the rise of global jihadism. This tension between Turkey's geopolitical goals and the security threat presented by global jihadism is a principal reason for the ambiguities, inconsistencies and hesitations characterizing the AKP's foreign policy in this regard. For instance, Turkey declared al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group based in Syria, as a terrorist organization.^v Yet, when a coalition of opposition groups including al-Nusra Front took the control of the Idlib city center from the Syrian regime in March 2015, the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu characterized the "liberation of Idlib by opposition forces" as a welcome development.^{vi} Turkey's support for this alliance including al-Nusra Front puts it at odds with the US and other Western powers prioritizing the fight against the self-declared Islamic State (IS).^{vii}

Similarly, the AKP government has taken a more proactive policy to prevent foreign fighters from crossing the Turkish-Syrian border as Turkey came under intense pressure from the Western governments.^{viii} Yet, Turkey has been much less proactive in limiting the flow of its own citizens to Syria. There is no indication that

the Turkish government is gravely concerned with Salafist Jihadism threatening Turkey.^{ix} The AKP leaders do not expect that returnee jihadists would be motivated to stage attacks in Turkey. As the negotiated release of Turkish hostages who were captured by the IS militants in September 2014 suggests, the Turkish leaders seem to believe that it is possible to make a deal with the jihadists. Instead, the AKP perceives the Gülenist movement known for its espousal of a more “moderate” form of public Islam as the major threat since the corruption scandals of December 2014.^x

Another consequence of the Syrian civil war is the gains of the Syrian Kurds that greatly complicate the AKP’s attempts to neutralize the PKK as an armed force and bring an end to three decades of Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. As the Syrian regime withdrew from the Kurdish majority areas in northern Syria (*Rojava* composed of *Afrin*, *Kobani*, and *Cizire* regions that are not territorially contiguous), the PKK through its affiliate, the PYD, established control in these areas in the summer of 2012. While these areas largely avoided destructive fighting, the rise of the IS began to threaten the Kurdish controlled territories in the summer of 2014. In the face of this development, the Turkish government vacillated. On the one hand, it does not have close relations with the IS unlike some other Islamist groups in Syria that receive active support from the government.^{xi} While there has been a flurry of allegations that the AKP provided active support to the IS militants battling the Kurdish forces in Syria, there is no firm evidence that the Turkish government helped IS coordinate its attacks.^{xii} Furthermore, the IS’s reputation for brutal violence and extremely rigid Islamic practices does not find a receptive audience among the AKP leaders. On the other hand, the AKP has been deeply concerned about the rise of the

Kurdish autonomy in Syria emboldening the PKK. From a geopolitical perspective, the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Syria reduces the AKP's Kurdish support and leverage in its negotiations. For this reason, the IS's onslaught against the Kobani region in September 2014 and its territorial gains at the expense of the PYD was viewed as a *fait accompli* by the Turkish government.

However, the AKP underestimated the Western publics' and policymakers' fear and abhorrence of the IS that actively publicizes its distinctive mode of violence including beheadings of the Western hostages. For the first time, the US decided to provide direct military help to the PKK despite the objections of Turkey. The intensive US airstrikes helped prevent the IS forces from conquering the Kobani city center. Meanwhile, the PKK has gained a new popular prestige and legitimacy as the defender of the Kurdish people and the Kurdish youth in Turkey is mobilized to defend the Kobani. In fact, for the first time in modern history, a Kurdish nationalist movement, the PKK, has now achieved armed presence with significant mass mobilization capacity in all four pieces of historical Kurdistan.

The negotiations between the AKP government and the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan resulted in a truce that mostly persists despite occasional flashes in the last two years. The government's motto "*Analar Ağlamasın*" (Don't Let Mothers Cry) received broad public support and facilitated the government's ability to pursue direct negotiations with the PKK. However, Kurdish mothers continued to weep as a large number of Kurdish youth from Turkey has lost their lives in armed clashes with the jihadists in Syria especially since the summer of 2014. According to my records, at least 351 individuals from Turkey were killed in Rojava from May

2014 to May 2015, a number higher than annual PKK fatalities since 1999 except for 2012. While some of these individuals were trained PKK militants, others were fresh recruits who directly traveled to the town of Kobani. A plurality of these individuals were from Diyarbakır (19 percent) and sizeable numbers were born in Şırnak, Mardin, Hakkari, Van, Urfa, , Siirt, Muş, and Batman. As the bodies of these fighters were returned to their families, the sense of peace that was briefly achieved by the truce between the Turkish security forces and the PKK was shattered. A constant stream of funerals attended by large crowds served as a visceral reminder of the precarious existence of the Kurdish people and bolstered the PKK's claim about the indispensability of its armed forces.

In summary, the transformation of the Syrian internal conflict into a bloody civil war with a highly fragmented insurgency facing a severely weakened but tenacious regime starkly reveals the limits of the AKP's ambitious foreign policy to reshape regional politics according to its own image. As the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood that would be a natural ally of the AKP has failed to lead the uprising and remained a group of old exiles lacking strong grassroots connections, violent Salafist groups have emerged as the forces on the ground. While these groups espouse exclusivist and rigid Islamist ideological frameworks that have little in common with the public Islam espoused by the AKP, they remain the only effective instruments challenging the Assad regime. While the AKP and these groups share the strategic goal of the overthrow of the Assad regime, the rise of the IS has brought significant Western pressure on the AKP to limit its dealings with the jihadists. In this geopolitical context, Salafi Jihadism has gained a foothold in Turkey.

3. The Appeal of Salafi Jihadism in Turkey

There is a strong scholarly consensus that “Turkish Islam” has unique features that make its more pragmatic, tolerant, and accommodative of differences compared to forms of Islam found in the Arab Middle East. Hanefi-Maturidism that has been one of the core elements of Islam in Turkey is widely conceptualized as being more flexible, adaptive, conducive to rationality, and less exclusivist. Also, Turkish “nationalism is a check on Islamic ideas and practices perceived to be Arab in origin, further limiting the influence of transnational Islamic movements.”^{xiii} Scholars identify a variety of factors that contribute to moderation of Turkish Islam. An influential perspective focuses on the historical evolution of Nakşibendi brotherhoods in Anatolia and their encounters with the state since the late Ottoman times.^{xiv} Another conventional approach is to study how economic liberalization and the proliferation of Islamic civil society have moderated Turkish Islam in the post-1980 period.^{xv} A third approach develops a more institutionalist perspective and aims to understand the moderate turn of Turkish Islamism as a consequence of electoral politics guarded by autonomous military and judicial entities.^{xvi}

Yet these scholarly perspectives are less helpful to make sense of the AKP’s electoral triumphalism and authoritarian turn and the rising appeal of Islamist violence in Turkey in the last several years. According to a public opinion survey conducted in January 2015, around 20 percent of the respondents characterized the attack against the French Charlie Hebdo magazine as a “justified assault in the face of insult to Prophet Mohammed.”^{xvii} Similarly, around 20 percent of the respondents approved “violent acts in the name of Islam,” an increase of six percentage points

since September 2014. Interestingly, around 43 percent of the respondents argued that the real victim of the Charlie Hebdo attacks was the Islamic world. More than half of the respondents (54 percent) agreed with the statement that “crusader attacks against Islam continue”.^{xviii} Furthermore, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted in seven Middle Eastern countries in the spring of 2014, around 45 percent of the respondents from Turkey were not concerned that “al-Qaeda or other extremist groups could take control of Syria.” The ratio of respondents in Turkey not concerned with this possibility was higher than any other nation.^{xix}

It can be argued that geopolitical developments since the 9/11 attacks and especially after the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011 have generated transnational influences conducive to the proliferation of Islamic activism prone to armed struggle. In particular, Salafi jihadism, which espouses a puritan understanding of Islam, aims to emulate the first generations of Islam and endorses violence to achieve this goal, has increased its mobilization capacity during this period.^{xx} Global Salafi jihadism as a modern movement has its origins in the formation of a pan-Islamist ideology in Saudi Arabia that gained transnational significance with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.^{xxi} The US invasions of Iraq in 2003 acted as a further catalyst for global jihadism and provided it with a strategic focal point and effective propaganda mechanisms.^{xxii} The Salafi jihadist ideology has had a growing appeal and contributed to an increasing number of suicide missions.^{xxiii} While many Muslims who decided to join the fight for the *ummah* were not necessarily motivated by the Salafi jihadist ideology, they developed such sympathies as a result of their encounters with and participation in the Salafi-jihadist movements. As these

movements have become the most effective fighting forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, their prestige among Sunni Muslims who are deeply concerned with the plight of their co-religionists has significantly increased.

In this context, the Salafi jihadist movements have gained more attraction and prestige among Islamist circles in Turkey. The rapid deterioration of the popular uprising in Syria into a vicious civil war resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of individuals and the displacement of around 10 million people has had a transformative effect on Islamic activism in Turkey. In the last years, there has been a proliferation of small Islamist groups using the internet and the social media to propagate their views about the Syrian war.^{xxiv} The border between humanitarianism and human rights activism, on the one hand, and armed struggle, on the other, has become highly porous. For many Islamist groups, non-violent and violent resistance became complementary given the direness of the situation in Syria. In the face of the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime, these groups are willing to overlook the jihadist groups' widespread human rights violations.^{xxv}

At the same time, it would be misleading to characterize Islamists in Turkey as being unconditionally supportive of the individuals who travel abroad to wage jihad. Prominent Islamist activists express their reservations with the militarization of Islamist struggle. For instance, in an article published few years after the US invasion of Iraq, Hamza Türkmen, a prominent Islamist activist, offers a critical perspective of individuals who disregarded alternative and non-violent methods of resistance and became life-style jihadists engaging in disproportionate violent attacks. While he applauds individuals who joined the Islamic resistance movements

in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq, he cautioned against the tendency to draw global strategies on the basis of these local conflicts.^{xxvi} In particular, Islamist activists in Turkey keep a critical distance from the IS that represents the most radical form of Salafi jihadism. While they typically characterize the IS as a consequence of the external occupation, war, and repressive rule, they were forthcoming in their criticisms of its excessive and brutal violence (especially the killing of fellow Sunni Muslims), and its superficial and literal interpretation of Islamic sources.^{xxvii}

It is also important to treat with caution the allegations that many Islamic associations, especially in Kurdish areas, actively support the IS in Turkey.^{xxviii} The Kurdish nationalists accused HÜDA-PAR supporters for supporting jihadists and engaged in deadly fights with them during the Kobani riots of October 6-8, 2014. However, it is unlikely that the Kurdish Hezbollah from which HÜDA-PAR emerged as a legal party in 2012 has any institutional linkages with the jihadist groups in Syria given their salient ideological distances. While the latter exhibit a strong anti-Shiite position, the Kurdish Hezbollah, strongly influenced by the Iranian Revolution, continues to enjoy warm relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.^{xxix} It is more likely that young individuals from Hezbollahi families develop Salafi-jihadist tendencies.^{xxx}

These caveats aside, Salafi jihadist groups have become visible and active in Turkey in the last few years. Meanwhile, a sizeable number of Turkish citizens have traveled to Syria fight with the Salafi jihadist groups. Their profile has become more diverse defying facile categorizations, as the conflict in Syria was increasingly

brutalized and transformed into an intricate web of alliances with no end in sight. ^{xxx}

Given the preliminary nature of this research, one can draw causal inferences only with limited confidence about the motivations of these individuals who join the Islamist groups. Empirical observations seem to support two arguments. First, it appears that many of these individuals established contacts with the Salafist jihadist groups in Syria through informal and local networks. As in Tunisia, an expansion of Islamic civil society after a period of state repression and regulation (February 28 process), is not necessarily a panacea for extremism. ^{xxxii} The newly founded freedoms facilitate radicalization as messages of the jihadists reach larger audiences in a context of widespread Muslim suffering. Next, the decision to wage jihad is often motivated by expectations of high levels of political efficacy, the belief that their actions would affect outcomes. Hence, it is not surprising that many individuals with college education and political efficacy risk their well-being to defend fellow Muslims who are perceived to be under existential threat. In this sense, the appeal of jihad cannot be reduced to socioeconomic and cultural factors as it involves a very strong political aspiration.

ⁱ I use the term “Islamist” to denote political ideologies that aim to increase public presence and social role of Islam through a variety of means. Obviously, Islamists could have either authoritarian or democratic tendencies. Some Islamists endorse and engage in violence, others oppose violence.

ⁱⁱ Sabri Çitfçi and Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Soft Power, Religion and anti-Americanism in the Middle East,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2015). Published online. Available at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fpa.12090/abstract>.

ⁱⁱⁱ Yüksel Taşkın, “Arap Baharı ve Türkiye’deki İslamcı Çevrelere Etkileri: “Baharımızı Kışa Çevirtmeyeceğiz,” 303-304 *Birikim* (July-August 2014): 105-116.

^{iv} In an interview with journalist Ruşen Çakır, the President of Religious Affairs, Mehmet Görmez, explains the rise of violent Salafi movements as a consequence of the tragedies characterizing the Muslim world since the first Afghan war. Full interview is available at <http://www.rusencakir.com/Diyanet-İsleri-Baskani-Mehmet-Gormezle-Selefilik-ISID-ve-Turkiye-uzerine-soylesi-tam-metin/3016>.

^v Abu Musab Al Suri, an ideologue of jihad and the author of *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*, has a strong influence over al-Nusra Front.

^{vi} Reported by *Bugün*, April 22, 2015. Available at <http://www.bugun.com.tr/son-dakika/basbakan-davutoglunun--haberi/1603548>.

^{vii} For instance, see “Turkey, Saudi Arabia Join Forces to Help Anti-Assad Rebels,” *U.S. News & World Report* May 7, 2015. Available at <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/05/07/apnewsbreak-turkey-saudi-in-pact-to-help-anti-assad-rebels>.

^{viii} According to an official statement, Turkey deported 1,300 foreigners and banned 12,800 individuals from entering Turkey. Reported by *Milliyet*, April 22, 2015. Available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-den-isid-e-gecit-yok-/siyaset/detay/2048089/default.htm>.

^{ix} There are conflicting information about the perpetrators of the dual cars bomb attacks in the Reyhanlı district of Hatay across the Syrian border on May 11, 2013. While the Turkish officials accuse a group affiliated with the Syrian regime for being responsible for the attacks, a Turkish ambassador declared that al-Qaeda plotted the attacks. Reported by *Bianet*, April 7, 2014. Available at <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/154749-disisleri-nden-reyhanli-aciklamasi>. The bomb attacks killed 52 individuals.

^x The Gülen network is now officially defined as a group threatening Turkey’s national security. Reported by *Hürriyet*, May 1, 2015. Available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28885734.asp>.

^{xi} For instance, the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham with al-Qaeda ties has a close relationship with Turkey.

^{xii} For a compilation of these allegations, see David L. Philipps, “Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey List, *Huffington Post*, November 9, 2014. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html.

^{xiii} Jenny White, *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 43.

^{xiv} Şerif Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” *Turkish Studies* 6 (June 2005): 145-165.

^{xv} For instance, see Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Berna Turam, *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

^{xvi} For instance, see Güneş Murat Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010.

^{xvii} An entity affiliated with the Kurdish Hezbollah organized a rally in Diyarbakir attended by large crowds to protest the Charlie Hebdo magazine on January 23, 2015. A speaker declared, “we will cut the tongue of ones who insult our Prophet.” Reported by *Hürriyet*, January 24, 2015. Available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28040915.asp>.

^{xviii} The survey was conducted by the MetroPoll Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Company. Available at <http://www.metropoll.com.tr/arastirmalar/siyasi-arastirma-9/1779>.

^{xix} Available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/16/syrias-neighbors-want-assad-to-step-down-but-no-appetite-for-aid-to-rebels>.

^{xx} For different forms of Salafism, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 207-239.

^{xxi} For a systematic analysis of the emergence and rise of Muslim foreign fighters phenomenon, see Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," *International Security* (Winter 2010/11): 53-94.

^{xxii} Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War," *Middle East Journal* 60 (Winter 2006): 11-32.

^{xxiii} Assaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks," *International Security* 33 (Winter 2008/09): 46-78.

^{xxiv} Several websites including www.takvahaber.net, www.mustaqim.net, and www.enfalmedya.com (established after an earlier website, www.takvahaber.com was shut down) openly support the self-declared Islamic State. Other websites such as www.ummetislam.net and www.incanews.com are supportive of al-Nusra Front. These websites often engage in accusations against each other.

^{xxv} For instance, *Özgür-Der*, an Islamist civil society organization established in reaction to the February 28 process, issued a press release critical of the Kurdish nationalist claims that Islamists forces committed massacres in Rojava. Available at http://www.ozgurder.org/news_detail.php?id=3019. *Özgür-Der* branches became targets of physical attacks by Kurdish nationalists. For violations in Syria by Human Rights Watch, see <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/syria>.

^{xxvi} Hamza Türkmen, "İslam'da Silahlı Mücadele ve Şiddet," *Haksöz* 169 (April 2005). Available at <http://www.haksozhaber.net/islamda-silahlı-mucadele-ve-siddet-28813yy.htm>.

^{xxvii} For instance, see the article titled "Müslümanlar IŞİD'e Nasıl Yaklaşmalı? (Soruşturma)" at <http://www.haksozhaber.net/muslumanlar-ıside-nasil-yaklasmali-sorusturma-52271h.htm>. A typical argument is that the IS militants are modern day Kharijites who murdered Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Mohammed in 661.

^{xxviii} For instance, a Kurdish nationalist movement leader claimed that there were 400 associations supporting the IS only in Diyarbakır. Reported by *Radikal*, September 21, 2014. Available at <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/diyarbakirda-ıside-destek-veren-400-dernek-kuruldu-iddiasi-1214035>.

^{xxix} The HÜDA PAR denies having any relationship with the jihadist groups in Syria. "HÜDA PAR IŞİD ile İlgili Ne Düşünüyor?" *Hürseda Haber* August 8, 2014. Available at <http://hurseda.net/printNews.php?id=123158>.

^{xxx} Mehmet Kurt, *Türkiye'de Hizbullah*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015, pp. 127-8.

^{xxxi} For an analysis of these individuals, see Güneş Murat Tezcür and Sabri Çiftçi, *Radical Turks: Why Turkish Citizens Join ISIS?* *Foreign Affairs* November 11, 2014. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-11-11/radical-turks>.

^{xxxii} David D. Kirkpatrick, "New Freedoms in Tunisia Drive Support for ISIS," *The New York Times*, October 21, 2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/africa/new-freedoms-in-tunisia-drive-support-for-isis.html/>