


**POLITICAL STABILITY  
AND  
TWO-ROUND SINGLE DISTRICT  
ELECTORAL SYSTEM  
SIMULATION MODEL**



**Executive Summary**



TURKISH INDUSTRIALISTS' AND BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION

# **POLITICAL STABILITY AND TWO-ROUND SINGLE DISTRICT ELECTORAL SYSTEM SIMULATION MODEL**

**Executive Summary**

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# FOREWORD

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*This publication is the executive summary of the report entitled "Political Stability and Two-Round Single District Electoral System Simulation Model", which was prepared by Associate Professor Seyfettin Gürsel in Turkish, in 1998.*



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# **POLITICAL STABILITY AND TWO-ROUND SINGLE DISTRICT ELECTORAL SYSTEM SIMULATION MODEL**

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# 1. Proportional d'Hondt Electoral System

## 1.1 Turkish Political Structure and the Problem of Political Stability

Since 1987 Turkish political structure has been characterised by a large degree of fragmentation due to factors that lie outside the scope of the present study. This is particularly in the interest of the present study as long as it will be persistent within a predictable time horizon. It is common knowledge that the cultural-political differentiation of the Turkish society is one of the main reasons underlying the present fragmentation. Coupled with this objective factor is the dismantling of the traditional political parties by the 12 September military regime, which gave rise to divisions within the right-of-the-centre and the left-of-the-centre. Such fragmentation has ossified during the past decade.

There are seven political parties with a vote of more than 4% at the national level: FP (Virtue Party), ANAP (Motherland Party), DYP (True Path Party), DSP (Democratic Left Party), CHP (Republican People's Party), MHP (Nationalist Action Party), and HADEP (People's Democracy Party). The party that emerged as the winner of the last elections received a mere 22% of the total vote. Various opinion polls indicate that this situation has not changed much since 1995. The fragmentation index of the Parliament that was elected in 1995 is 0.77, too high a figure by political science standards.<sup>1</sup> This structure, combined with the current d'Hondt system that is applied with a national threshold, has consequences that adversely affect political stability. These consequences can be grouped under three headings:

1 - The most likely government would be a tripartite coalition or a minority one. It goes without saying that a minority government would find it too difficult to establish governmental stability. As regards to a tripartite coalition, assuming that the ranking of parties according to the vote distribution in 1995 would not drastically change in the next election, it is obvious that the third party of a tripartite government coalition would most probably be the one that would have barely passed the 10% national threshold. There are two candidates for this: CHP and MHP.

Including either of these parties, a tripartite coalition government would not be able to carry out effectively either democratic reforms or, as the case may be, economic

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1 Fragmentation index is calculated using Herfindahl - Hirshman concentration index  $1 - \sum p^2$ , where p is the percentage share of seats of each party represented in Parliament. In Italy, where fragmentation is viewed as a problem because it adversely affects political stability, the 1976 index was 0.76 despite the fact that the average constituency size was 20 (as against 7 in Turkey). In Spain, where average constituency size is almost the same as that in Turkey, average index during the 1977-1993 period was 0.63. (D. W. Rae, "Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition", *J. of Eco Perspectives*, Winter 1995).

reforms and decisions that have become urgent. Therefore, political instability will continue to dominate the agenda. Due to their small room for manoeuvre, these borderline parties may agree to join at a coalition government only with a programme that their electoral base will not object to. In other words, parties in such a position are not likely to reach a consensus - based on mutual concessions warranted by any coalition government - on a consistent programme.

2 - Under the existing electoral system, the party that emerges as the leader is over-represented in the Parliament. For example, in the 1995 general elections, the Welfare Party (RP) received 21.3% of the vote and 28.7% of the seats in the Parliament. If coupled with a high national threshold and an average constituency size returning a limited number of seats, the d'Hondt electoral system would normally produce this result and would not necessarily lead to political instability. This might indeed help a dominant party with about 40% of the vote come to power single-handedly and might contribute to governmental stability.

However, if the party with the highest percentage of votes is the one that the majority of the electorate would not like to see in government, this characteristic could indeed add to governmental instability and lead to political tension, culminating in political instability and even in the interruption of the democratic regime. Like all other proportional representation systems, the d'Hondt system is a categorical one that allows voters to state their first choices only.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, unlike the ordinal systems that allow voters to state their preference ranking among the parties, this system, in its allocation of seats, does not differentiate between parties in terms of their popularity as a second choice: a party, that is quite unpopular as the second choice of voters and which is unlikely to bring the majority of the electorate to a consensus, is treated the same way as the one that is highly popular taking into account second choices and is acceptable to the majority of the electorate as a governing party. In other words, two parties that get the same percentage of the votes, however enjoying different degrees of popularity as a second choice, would get almost the same number of seats.

This is the situation in Turkey. According to opinion polls (VERİ A.Ş., April 1996 and May 1998), RP/FP, alongside HADEP, is the most unpopular party as the second choice, but it came as the leading party out of the 1995 elections, though with a very small margin (1.6 percentage points). In the next general elections, it will probably come out as the leading party again with a small margin, or, at worst, as the runner up, and will be represented in the Parliament over its share of the vote (again calculated on the basis of the first preferences only.) Therefore, the next general elections are very likely to usher in a mere repetition of the 1995

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed treatment of the subject, see S. Gürsel, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Siyasete Etkileri" (Electoral Systems and their Political Effects), in *TÜSIAD-KALDER 5. Kalite Kongresi Tebliğleri* (Papers submitted to the 5th TÜSIAD-KALDER Quality Meeting), pp. 41-51, November 1996.

elections in terms of its political consequences. Possible developments that can ensue after the elections are quite similar to those that have been experienced under the RP-DYP coalition government, and their impact on political stability is already known.

3 - Under the current electoral system, which is the same as the one applied in the 1995 general elections, there was a formidable national threshold as high as 10%. This threshold is claimed to fulfil the latter of the principles of "fair representation and governmental stability" set forth in the reworded article 67 of the Constitution. One result of the 1995 elections was evident: MHP was not represented in the Parliament with its 8.2% share of the vote. Yet, an outcome that could help to bring stability was not achieved. Therefore, the explicit violation of the principle of fair representation did not at all contribute to governmental stability. Recurrence of the same situation in the next general elections, and even the exclusion of yet another party from the Parliament, is not a remote possibility. The exclusion of those parties representing more than 2 million voters cannot be argued to contribute to political stability in the wider sense.

At this stage, the current electoral system needs to be analysed systematically in terms of these three sources of instability.

## **1.2 Undesirable Aspects of a High-Threshold d'Hondt System**

### **Likelihood of a Single-Party Government**

The likelihood of a two-party government under the current electoral system can be measured using the high-threshold d'Hondt system simulation model<sup>3</sup> which was developed before the 1995 elections. In this connection, one can argue that the likelihood of a single-party government needs to be evaluated as well. However, it should be recalled once again that a detailed analysis of the alternative of a single-party government under the current system would be redundant since the system is not dominated presently, nor is likely to be dominated in the predictable future, by a single party.

Under the model that simulates the d'Hondt electoral system as currently applied, FP/RP would need to get at least 35% of the vote to form a single-party government, DYP 36%, ANAP 37%, DSP 46% and CHP 41%, assuming that MHP's

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<sup>3</sup> Software for this model that simulates the current electoral system and for the two-round electoral system simulation model, which is the subject of this study, has been developed by Dr Erhan Bozdağ of ITU Industrial Engineering Department. I am grateful to him. However, I am responsible for the construction of the models, hence for any errors therein. For details about the functioning of the simulation model of the current electoral system, see *Seçim Sistemi Tartışması ve İki Turlu Sistem (Electoral System Debate and the Two-Round System)*, TÜSİAD, April 1996, Appendix 3.

vote remained under the national threshold.<sup>4</sup> Presently, any of these percentage shares is not possible at all. Furthermore, FP's forming a single-party government with a 35% vote would not be compatible with democratic consensus and would not be conducive to political stability as long as its ranking as a second choice, that is, its overall social backing, remained insufficient.

In the event of a merger between the two right-of-the-centre parties (assuming MHP candidates would not run in the elections on FP tickets), the minimum vote required for a right-of-the-centre government would be no less than 39%. This total also includes the 1.5% vote of BBP (Great Unity Party). Therefore, a united right-of-the-centre party would only hope to come out as the governing party if it received all of the votes of DYP and ANAP plus one or two points. This is a very unlikely outcome. If MHP candidates ran in the elections on FP tickets, the minimum vote required for a right-of-the-centre government would rise to 42 percent<sup>5</sup>. Even if we assume that the two right-of-the-centre parties got united, which is a very meagre possibility for the time being, the likelihood of such a united party's getting a majority in the Parliament would remain very low because it would need a total vote that is at least 4.5 points over the allies' combined vote in 1995.

### **Merging of Votes**

When the results of the 1995 general elections did not allow any two-party government combination other than the DYP-RP coalition, various parties, especially DYP, suggested that election alliances be allowed and the so-called rule of merging of votes be included in the electoral system. It has been argued that these amendments would facilitate two-party coalition governments and hence, would lead to greater political stability. According to the proposed amendment, any two (or more) parties declaring an alliance would apply to the Supreme Election Board to demand the merging of their votes in every constituency for the calculation of their total number of seats, which would be proportionally allocated to either, according to their votes in each constituency.

As it might have been noted, the d'Hondt system would remain unchanged. The aim is to benefit from that feature of the current system that enables over-representation in the Parliament of those parties with a vote over the average. This so-called solution is in fact based on a naive and politically unacceptable

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<sup>4</sup> In order to form a single-party government, left-of-the-centre parties have to get a higher percentage of the vote because their votes are often concentrated in urban constituencies which return relatively fewer seats compared to their size. DSP also suffers from the disadvantage of high regional concentration of its vote.

<sup>5</sup> For detailed findings and debate on this issue see S. Gürsel, "Seçim İttifakları ve Siyasal İstikrar" (Election Alliances and Political Stability), *Milliyet*, May 1998.

assumption that other parties would not form an alliance. When other alliances are also taken into account, it will be observed that the merging of votes will not produce the desired outcome.

As a matter of fact, the simulation model of the current electoral system, operating under the merging of the votes rule, clearly indicates that two-party alliances are very unlikely to get a majority of seats. For example, an ANAP-DYP alliance, against a FP-MHP alliance, would need to get at least 42% of the vote in order to have a majority in the Parliament. This is true under the assumption that DSP and CHP would not form an election alliance (would not choose to merge their votes). In the circumstances where these two parties choose to merge their votes, the minimum vote needed by the right-of-the-centre in order to come to power would rise to 44%.

The parties of the 55th government have even a lower chance of coming to power in this way. The minimum vote needed for an ANAP-DSP majority in the Parliament is 45% in a scenario where DYP and MHP would merge their votes, FP would run in the elections single-handedly and CHP would receive 11% to pass the national threshold. In a scenario where CHP would get 9% and fail to pass the necessary minimum (one may wonder how, then, we would be able to talk about political stability), the national percentage that would bring an ANAP-DSP alliance to power would be reduced by a mere 2 points to 42%. In the 1995 elections, the combined vote of ANAP and DSP was about 34%. Even if we add 1 or 2 points on this total to account for the vote of DTP (Democratic Turkey Party), the chances of the present coalition to get a Parliamentary majority in the next elections still remain very low. Furthermore, if FP, DYP and MHP chose to merge their votes, such an alliance would need no less than a combined vote of 45.5% in order to get the majority of seats in the Parliament against a possible ANAP-DSP-CHP alliance. If CHP remained outside or were excluded from this alliance, the counter alliance would need 43%.<sup>6</sup>

This last scenario deserves some more attention.

The percentage of votes used in this scenario are:

FP: 19%, DYP: 14%, MHP: 10% Total: 43%

ANAP: 25%, DSP: 15%

CHP: 12%

Other: 5%.

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<sup>6</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see S. Gürsel, "Oy Birleştirmesi ya da Nafile Seçim Stratejisi" (Merging of Votes or a Futile Election Strategy), *Milliyet*, 1996, and the article cited in the previous footnote.

The allocation of seats would be as follows:

FP-DYP-MHP: 280

ANAP-DSP: 228

CHP: 42

In this scenario FP would remain slightly below its percentage vote in the 1995 elections and DYP would lose a considerable fraction of its votes due to various factors including but not limited to the RP-DYP government experience. On the other hand, ANAP would receive the votes lost by DYP, DSP would maintain, while CHP would slightly increase its percentage of votes. Based on the opinion polls of recent months, this seems to be a very probable scenario. In such a situation, a FP-DYP-MHP coalition would easily come to power. The relatively low percentage of votes needed for such a majority in the Parliament is due to the fact that these three parties complement each other better in terms of the regional distribution of their votes than an alliance between the right-of-the-centre and left-of-the-centre parties. This would happen despite the shift of some of the right-of-the-centre votes to ANAP because of voters' disappointment with the RP-DYP experience, which would make ANAP the leading party by a considerable margin (with 25% of the total vote). In such a situation, it is certainly impossible to talk about political stability. If alliances and the merging of votes were permitted for the sake of greater political stability, the most probable winner of the next election would be a FP-DYP-MHP alliance.

### **Tripartite Coalitions**

If elections are held without modifying the current electoral system, a tripartite coalition government will be inevitable unless there is a surprising change in the distribution of votes. In this connection, it should be noted that the seats of FP, DYP and MHP (if it passes the threshold) are very likely to add up to more than 275. If FP gets 21%, DYP 14.5% and MHP 10.5% (a combined share of 46%), they will come out from the election with a total of 276 seats and each with 145, 80 and 51 seats, respectively. Based on the recent opinion polls, these estimates are very likely to come true (with some margin of error) in the next general elections. For other political reasons, FP might not join a governing coalition. Under these circumstances, the only viable alternative would be a coalition between ANAP, DYP and MHP.

There may be some benefits in discussing the conditions for a coalition between ANAP, DSP and CHP. A 0.5% drop in the DYP votes to 14%, the increase of ANAP votes to 23% and DSP's and CHP's maintaining their percentage votes

(some 15% and 11%, respectively) would be sufficient for these three parties to have a majority of seats in the Parliament. It is assumed that FP will maintain its 1995 vote (21.5%) and MHP will pass the threshold (10.5%). In such a distribution of votes, seats of ANAP, DSP and CHP will add up to 276. However, the same distribution produces a majority for ANAP, DYP and MHP as well (281 seats). Therefore, these parties can also form a government.

To sum up, the next elections are very likely to result in a tripartite coalition government. If MHP passes the threshold, the most probable coalition is the one between ANAP, DYP and MHP. A coalition between FP, DYP and MHP, or between ANAP, DSP and CHP, is not improbable, either. Arithmetically, there is almost no doubt that ANAP, DYP and DSP will obtain a combined majority. However, an agreement between these three parties on forming a coalition government depends on political conditions. It is up to the reader to decide the extent to which these tripartite coalitions will be conducive to or will detract from political stability.

### **1.3 Likelihood of a Two-Party Coalition Government**

For a systematic discussion of the likelihood of a two-party coalition government, two basic alternatives can be taken into account in terms of distribution of votes. The first alternative is the case where vote differences between the parties in the 1995 elections will be approximately maintained in the next general elections. Let us recall that DYP and ANAP got almost an equal percentage of the votes (around 19.5%) in the 1995 elections. ANAP's votes were 5 points above DSP's, the latter's votes 4 points above CHP, and RP/FP's votes 2 points above DYP and 13 points above MHP. This difference will be treated as 10 points in the scenarios in which MHP passes the threshold. Results of the vote distribution scenarios based on the first alternative are given at Table 1.

There are six two-party coalition combinations in Table 1, namely, between ANAP and DSP, ANAP and DYP, DSP and CHP, FP and ANAP, FP and DYP, and FP and MHP. Each of these combinations corresponds to a scenario, and the table shows the minimum votes each is required to get in order to attain a majority in the Parliament. Each basic scenario has six sub-scenarios. Minimum percentage of required votes naturally changes in the case where one or two of the six parties under consideration fail to pass the threshold. These sub-scenarios have been modeled according to the failure or success of CHP and MHP, the parties with the lowest percentage of votes in the 1995 elections among the six to pass the threshold: the situation where both pass the threshold, where either MHP or CHP fails, or where both fail. The votes defining all these scenarios are given in Table 1A.

**Table 1. Minimum vote percentages needed for two-party coalitions under the current electoral system (Alternative 1)**

<b>Two-party coalition governments</b>	<b>1 Both CHP and MHP pass the threshold</b>	<b>2 MHP fails to pass the threshold</b>	<b>3 CHP fails to pass the threshold</b>	<b>4 Both CHP and MHP fail to pass the threshold</b>
Scenario 1 ANAP – DSP Percentage vote Number of seats	46% (142+144=286)	44% (282)	44% (282)	41% (277)
Scenario 2 ANAP – DYP Percentage vote Number of seats	44% * (168+110=278)**	42% (284)	42% (280)	39% (281)
Scenario 3 DSP – CHP Percentage vote Number of seats	48% (148+130=278)	46% (378)		
Scenario 4 FP - ANAP Percentage vote Number of seats	42% (153+124 = 277)	41% (283)	41% (285)	37% (284)
Scenario 5 FP - DYP Percentage vote Number of seats	42% (153+124=277)	40% (289)	41% (282)	37%*** (283)
Scenario 6 FP – MHP Percentage vote Number of seats	42% (180+96=276)		41% (283)	

\* See Table 1A for distribution of votes.

\*\* Seats held by government parties respectively. Columns 2, 3 and 4 show the total number of seats only. The distribution of seats between two parties would almost be the same as the one in the first column.

\*\*\* In this scenario, ANAP and DYP would also constitute a majority, with a total number of seats of 295.

**Table 1A. Percentage of votes assumed for Table 1**

	FP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	MHP	Other
<b>Scenario 1-1</b>	17.5	12.5	25.5	20.5	10.0	10.0	4
<b>Scenario 1-2</b>	20.0	13.0	24.5	19.5	10.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 1-3</b>	20.0	13.0	24.5	19.5	9.0	10.0	4
<b>Scenario 1-4</b>	21.0	16.0	23.0	18.0	9.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 2-1</b>	18.0	22.0	22.0	14.0	10.0	10.0	4
<b>Scenario 2-2</b>	21.0	21.0	21.0	14.0	10.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 2-3</b>	21.0	21.0	21.0	15.0	9.0	10.0	4
<b>Scenario 2-4</b>	23.0	19.5	19.5	15.0	9.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 3-1</b>	17.0	11.0	11.0	26.0	22.0	10.0	3
<b>Scenario 3-2</b>	17.0	12.0	12.0	25.0	21.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 4-1</b>	22.0	17.0	20.0	15.0	11.0	11.0	4
<b>Scenario 4-2</b>	21.5	19.0	19.5	15.0	12.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 4-3</b>	21.5	19.0	19.5	15.0	9.0	12.0	4
<b>Scenario 4-4</b>	19.5	21.0	17.5	18.0	9.0	9.0	6
<b>Scenario 5-1</b>	22.0	20.0	18.0	15.0	11.0	10.0	4
<b>Scenario 5-2</b>	21.0	19.0	20.0	15.0	12.0	9.0	4
<b>Scenario 5-3</b>	21.5	19.5	20.0	16.0	9.0	10.0	4
<b>Scenario 5-4</b>	19.5	17.5	22.0	17.0	9.0	9.0	6
<b>Scenario 6-1</b>	26.0	15.0	15.0	14.0	10.0	16.0	4
<b>Scenario 6-2</b>	25.5	15.5	15.5	15.0	9.0	15.5	4

Note: Scenario 1-1 depicts a vote distribution in which both CHP and MHP pass the threshold as described in Scenario 1 (column 1) in Table 1. Likewise, Scenario 1-2 represents a vote distribution as described in Scenario 1 (column 2) in Table 1 (where MHP fails to pass the threshold). The reader can find vote distribution corresponding to the 20 different scenarios in table 1 on the basis of the numbering convention explained here.

In the situation where both MHP and CHP pass the threshold, the minimum percentage of votes necessary for a two-party coalition would vary between 42% and 48%, depending on the combination. A left-of-the-centre coalition would need the highest percentage, which is 48%. In other words, a coalition between DSP and CHP would be the most difficult alternative among all two-party coalitions under the current electoral system. There are two main factors behind this. The first is that the stronger constituencies of these parties are in the cities and in relatively more developed areas. The current structure of the constituencies does not tend to favour cities or more developed areas in terms of allocation of seats. The second reason is that left-wing voters are regionally more heterogeneously distributed. Since left-wing voters are concentrated in certain constituencies, average number of votes necessary to return one seat tends to be higher.

The scenario for a left-of-the-centre coalition government (Scenario 3-1) envisages that DSP will get four points higher than CHP (see Table 1A), as assumed at the outset. Here the following question may well be asked: Would the result change if the reverse happened? This is a well-justified question because DSP voters are more regionally concentrated than their CHP counterparts. This implies that incremental increases in DSP's vote would bring less seats than those of CHP. We can reverse the order to give CHP a favourable difference of four points to answer this question (while the other percentages in Scenario 3.1 remain unchanged). In that case, the minimum vote necessary for a left-of-the-centre coalition government would drop by a mere 1 point to 47%.

Coalitions including FP would require the lowest percentage of votes. In all three alternatives (FP with ANAP, DYP or MHP), the required minimum vote would be 42%. This lower percentage is due to the constituency structure that tends to favour radical right-wing and right-of-the-centre parties, and because of the better regional complementarity of the voters of FP and other right-wing parties.<sup>7</sup>

ANAP and DSP would need to get 46% of the national vote in order to have a majority in the Parliament, which is improbable for the time being. Their combined vote in 1995 was less than 35%, and a swing of 10 to 11 points in favour of the parties of the present coalition government seems unlikely. The minimum vote necessary for a right-of-the-centre majority, that is, an ANAP-DYP coalition government, would be 44%. Let us recall that the combined vote of these two parties was 39% in 1995. Although opinion polls suggest that distribution of votes between the right-of-the-centre parties might change, there is no indication that their combined vote will increase. Thus, a right-of-the-centre majority is also very improbable.

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<sup>7</sup> FP's relative weakness in the Thrace, in the Aegean region and in the South is compensated by DYP whereas FP complements DYP in the Black Sea region. ANAP and FP complement each other in the Aegean and Thrace and in the East and Central Anatolia, respectively.

Taking into consideration these minimum vote requirements and the changes that are believed to have occurred during the past three or four years, we can conclude that a right-of-the-centre, left-of-the-centre or radical right-wing (FP-MHP) majority is out of question and a majority to be constituted by DYP and FP is a meagre probability. A FP-ANAP majority, on the other hand, has a good chance. If FP got approximately the same vote as RP and ANAP performed better, by one point or two, these two parties would easily attain, even exceed, the required minimum. At this point it might be recalled that RP and ANAP got respectively 21.3% and 19.7% of the vote (a combined vote of 41%) in the 1995 elections.

The questions whether FP and ANAP would agree to form a coalition government if they got a combined majority in the Parliament - a decision that will also depend on which one will be the winner - and whether such a coalition would bring political stability do not exactly fit in the scope of this study. However, the political feasibility of this alternative concerns us in one respect. If these two parties, especially ANAP, stating that they are in favour of such a coalition, sought votes in an early election to be held, this would be unobjectionable in terms of the democratic function of the elections. After all, ANAP voters would have cast their votes knowing and without opposing this possibility. Those ANAP voters who would not like to see FP in government would have voted for the other parties or would have abstained. However, if ANAP carried out an election campaign along the lines of what is now known as the "28 February process" in our political literature, and, after the election, attempted to form such a coalition, they would mislead those ANAP voters who do not want to see FP in government. Such a development would be incompatible with democratic ethics and for this very reason would not be conducive to political stability.

We have examined, in the foregoing passages, the chances of two-party coalition alternatives in a situation where all of the six parties are assumed to have passed the threshold. If either MHP or CHP failed to pass the threshold, the required minimum vote would drop by 2 points. A DSP-CHP, ANAP-DSP or ANAP-DYP majority would not be possible in this case, either. However, a FP-DYP coalition for which the required vote would fall down to 40% can be envisaged as a possible alternative. The examination of this alternative in terms of political stability is beyond the scope of this study. However, it should be borne in mind that this is a situation where a party enjoying about 10% of the vote would not be represented in the Parliament. Such a situation is disputable both in terms of democracy and political stability.

In those scenarios where both MHP and CHP fail to pass the threshold, the vote required for a majority would be 5 points lower. This would make an ANAP-DYP or FP-DYP coalition government a good possibility (with 39% and 37%, respectively). This, however, would be at the cost of depriving almost 20% of the voters of representation in and excluding two important parties from the Parliament. Although some of the two-coalition combinations would become feasible in such a situation, a democratic electoral system and political stability in general would be out of the question.

These outcomes, one can argue, depend on the characteristics of the vote distribution based on the relative strength of the parties as measured by the 1995 elections (which is shown in Table 1). However, simulations with different vote distributions affect the outcomes only marginally. This can be demonstrated by forming a second vote distribution alternative, which, though debatable because of its subjectivity and randomness, accounts for the tendencies as revealed by the opinion polls conducted during recent months. This is a situation where the gap between ANAP and DYP widens in favour of the former, the difference between DSP and CHP votes gets narrower, and the difference between ANAP and DSP is maintained. This alternative need not be examined in same depth as the first one. We can suffice with an examination of three scenarios, namely, the minimum percentage vote needed for ANAP and DYP, FP and DYP or DSP and CHP combinations having a majority of seats in Parliament. It will be sufficient to study these scenarios in cases where both MHP and CHP passed the threshold because the sub-scenarios produce almost the same outcomes, with vote differences presented in Table 1.

The vote distribution tested for an ANAP-DYP coalition government is:

FP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	MHP	Other
18	19.5	23.5	14.5	10.5	10	4

As shown above, ANAP's vote would be 4 points higher than DYP's. For this distribution, the simulation model generates 278 seats for ANAP plus DYP. Their combined percentage vote would be 43%, which is merely one point below the required minimum vote (44%) in Table 1. It cannot be argued that a one-point drop would significantly contribute to the chances of a right-of-the-centre government.

The vote distribution tested for an FP-DYP coalition government is:

FP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	MHP	Other
235	18.5	19	14.5	10.5	10	4

This scenario assumes that FP's vote would be somewhat higher than that in 1995 whereas DYP's vote would drop a little. In this case, the combined seats and combined votes of FP and DYP would be 276 and 42%, respectively. The necessary minimum vote would be the same as that for the first alternative. The outcome does not change when the difference between FP and DYP widens. However, the likelihood such coalition would be reduced as DYP got weaker and FP stronger. Besides, such a coalition would hardly contribute to political stability even if DYP agreed to ally with FP. If almost 90% of the 60% of the voters who did not vote for either party are definitely opposed to a government including FP, then such a coalition is not likely to bring stability. This aspect of the problem will be discussed below, in the context of second choice votes.

As to a DSP-CHP majority, the closing of the gap by CHP somewhat would not change the outcome. The minimum vote needed for their attaining majority in the Parliament would remain unchanged, at 48%.

### **Conclusions:**

If we are to make a general evaluation of the current electoral system, the following points should be emphasised:

- Given the currently fragmented political party regime, the electoral system makes the formation of a two-party coalition government considerably more difficult, that is believed to offer a greater chance for political stability.
- The next general elections to be held under the current electoral system are very likely to result in a tripartite coalition government or a short-lived minority government. A debate on new early elections will begin in Turkey the day after the early general elections that will be inevitably held in April 1999.
- Two-party coalition governments, which will restore governmental stability, would only be possible if two parties failed to pass the national threshold. The likelihood of such a situation is not known. Even if this did happen, it would not be possible to talk about the overall political stability that is the foundation on which governmental stability is based.
- Since the leading party would be overrepresented in the Parliament with respect to its national vote, a two-party coalition without that party would be impossible. On the other hand, if the winner is the one whose ranking as a second choice is lower than the runner up, or in other words, if it is

the one which is definitely opposed by most of the voters, it would be difficult to establish political stability with a coalition government led by such a party.

- If a dominant party emerges from the scene of political parties, it would be able to have a majority of seats in the Parliament single-handedly with a vote of 35% to 36%. If that is the one that fits the definition above, the outcome would be undemocratic outright, and the implication would be that the electoral system cease to serve its function.

The question to be posed at this stage is whether it is possible to strengthen governmental stability with a different electoral system and without jeopardising general political stability. Our answer is yes. Such a system exists, which is known as the two-round system.

## 2. Two-Round Electoral System

### 2.1 General Characteristics of the System

A previous study<sup>8</sup> conducted for TÜSİAD offered a detailed account of two-round electoral systems. Here it will be sufficient to discuss only the main features of this system.

The foremost characteristic of the system is that it is based on single-seat constituencies, also known as "single districts". The second characteristic is that winners are required to have 50% of the valid votes plus 1 in their constituencies. In a regime of parties characterised by a highly fragmented vote distribution, MPs in most of constituencies will be elected in the second round since a candidate's getting an absolute majority of votes at the first round is an exceptional situation.

This feature has a number of political implications:

1. In the second round, some voters find the opportunity to state their second choices and some others their third or fourth choices. Therefore, the distribution of seats among the parties is determined by an election mechanism that takes into account not only the first but also second and third choices of the voters. This mechanism results in a situation where those parties with relatively weaker support as a second choice are represented in the Parliament below their vote at the level of first preferences.

2. The system encourages those parties with similar electoral bases to form alliances. In order to win at the second round, it is necessary to get as many votes as possible from those parties that cannot contest, or, as a result of their alliance policy, do not contest, in the second round. If a party that refuses to form an alliance contests those that have formed an alliance, that party is less likely to win seats in individual constituencies than the allied parties. Therefore, every party seeks an alliance believing that its rivals would form one.

3. The formation of alliances between the parties reveals possible coalition alternatives before the election. The alliance that wins the election is the one with stronger support from the electorate. Thanks to this support, such a coalition government has a higher chance of establishing political stability.

4. Under the conditions prevailing in Turkey, the chances of two-party coalition governments within and across right-of-the-centre and left-of-the-centre parties are considerably higher than it is under the current system.

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<sup>8</sup> Gürsel, *Seçim Sistemi Tartışması ve İki Turlu Sistem (The Electoral System Debate and the Two-Round System)*, TÜSİAD, April 1996.

Before proceeding further, we need to make a comparative evaluation of the two variants of the two-round system, which are currently applied.

## 2.2 Two Different Variants of the System

The two variants are related to the rule of qualification for running in the second round. In the first variant, which is of French origin, all parties that receive votes of a certain percentage of all the registered voters in a constituency are qualified to run in the second round. If turnout in the first round is 70% to 75%, the second-round threshold corresponds to 16% to 17% of valid votes. This will hereinafter be referred to as the "multiparty variant". If this rule were applied in Turkey, at least 2 and at most 3 parties would contest in an overwhelming majority of constituencies.<sup>9</sup>

In the second variant of the two-round system, which is applied mostly in the former socialist countries that have recently adopted democracy<sup>10</sup>, the two candidates receiving the highest percentage of votes in the first round are qualified for the second. This will be referred to as the "two-party variant".

Of these two variants, the best one suiting Turkey is open to debate. A comparison of multi-party and two-party alternatives can be made according to certain criteria in order to determine the most suitable one. This comparison can be made according to four criteria:

1. Encouragement of alliances between parties.
2. Facilitation of formation of two-party coalition governments.
3. Having election results that particularly disfavour a certain party in terms of seats.
4. Encouragement of higher turnout in the second round.

The first two criteria are of primary importance for the electoral system reform whereas the others have only secondary importance.

Here we will suffice with the outcomes of the detailed analyses made through the simulation model.

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<sup>9</sup> When the two-round system is simulated with the 1995 election vote distribution, elections are concluded at the end of the first round in 22 constituencies while the second round elections are held with two candidates each in 331 constituencies and three each in 147. This simulation assumes alliances between FP and MHP, ANAP and DYP, and DSP and CHP. In the absence of a DSP-CHP alliance, there would be two candidates each in 301 constituencies at the second round, three each in 170, and four each in 7.

<sup>10</sup> For the application of the two-round electoral system worldwide, see S. Gürsel, *Seçim Sistemi Tartışması ve İki Turlu Sistem*, TÜSİAD, April 1996, Appendix 4.

## **1. Encouragement of Alliances**

The way alliances would operate in the two-round system and how they are treated in the simulation model must be explained in order to be able to evaluate the extent to which each of these two variants would encourage alliances. Parties forming an alliance in the two-round system agree in advance to withdraw in favour of one another in the second round even if they are qualified to run. The rule of the game is that the ally (or allies) with fewer first-round votes in a certain constituency, even though qualifying for the second round, withdraw(s) from the election in favour of the one with the higher vote. Generally, the party that withdraws from or is not qualified for the second round calls upon its voters to vote for its ally in the constituencies in which it runs. This is, of course, reciprocal.

In the simulation model the alliances has been designed assuming that both "loyal" voters of a party, i.e. those who state that they have no second choice, and those who declare that they have not made up their mind about a second choice would vote for the allied party in the second round. However, the same category of voters of those parties which did not join an alliance would not vote in the second round in those constituencies in which their (first choice) parties are not qualified to run.

The experiments conducted show that the multi-party variant encourages inter-party alliances more clearly than the two-party variant. The method that has been used can be summarised as follows:

A vote distribution is chosen first. Seats are allocated under the assumption that parties do not form any alliances in the multi-party variant. Subsequently, it is assumed that two parties agree to form an alliance while the other parties, which had not previously formed an alliance, decide to do likewise in order to avoid significant losses. If the formation of an alliance results in a greater number of seats for both parties, it is concluded that these two parties have an objective interest in forming an alliance and are thus, encouraged to do so. If any two parties form an alliance, the other parties have to do likewise to minimise the number of seats they would lose.

Secondly, the number of seats is computed with the same vote distribution for the two-party variant, with and without alliance scenarios. If the seats won by any alliance in one variant clearly outnumber its seats in the other variant, the former variant is said to be encouraging inter-party alliances more clearly.

This comparison has been made for two different vote distributions and two different groups of alliances. In the multi-party variant, if ANAP and DYP formed an alliance (against FP-MHP and DSP-CHP alliances), they would get 33 to 36 more seats than they would in the scenario where parties did not form any alliances. The greatest loss would be suffered by FP, which would be followed by DSP. FP would lose 52 seats if it did not form an alliance and 42 if it formed an alliance (with MHP). DSP would lose 38 without an alliance and 21 in alliance with CHP. The number of seats lost by the other parties would increase if they did not form an alliance.

Assuming a FP-DYP alliance (against an ANAP-DSP alliance) DYP would not win any extra seats over and above those in the non-alliance scenario while FP would lose far fewer seats. ANAP would get more seats, but its gains would drop by 10 as compared to those in the DYP-ANAP alliance scenario. On the other hand, DSP's forming an alliance with ANAP would bring to it more seats than it would get under an alliance with CHP.

The outcome of the experiments for the multi-party variant is that DYP and ANAP would maximise their seats if they formed an alliance under a given vote distribution. This scenario produces far more seats for these two parties than in the other alliance scenarios or in a non-alliance scenario. If DYP and ANAP formed an alliance, the other parties would inevitably get fewer seats than they would in a non-alliance scenario. They would also have to form election alliances in order to minimise their losses.

The two-party variant experiments also generate a greater number of seats for ANAP and DYP when they form an alliance. However, their gains would be fewer: 2 for DYP and 5 for ANAP. The reason is that in the two-party scheme both would get very close to the maximum number of seats they could win with an alliance.

Consequently, it can be argued that the multi-party variant encourages alliances more clearly. The two-party variant too offers some incentive, albeit weaker.

If for some reason the parties failed to form an alliance in the multi-party variant, the vote distribution of the electorate would be far less likely to result in a stable government. In that case, the election outcome would approximate to that of the majoritarian individual constituency system because of the fragmented vote, and distribution of seats would be very close to that under the current d'Hondt system. In the two-party variant, two parties would be running for every seat in the second round, and, even in the absence of alliances the electorate would find the

opportunity of merging their votes in the polls, which would increase the likelihood of a two-party coalition government. In the two-round system, the failure of the parties to form alliances is not rational. If at least two parties can be trusted to behave rationally, then the multi-party variant is more appropriate.

## **2. Facilitation of Two-Party Coalition Governments**

The aim of this study is to investigate the way the electoral system should be changed in order to increase the likelihood of two-party coalition governments. This will be examined in the third section through an analysis of the minimum vote percentages that two-party alliances are required to get in order to have a majority in the Parliament. A comparison of the two-party and multi-party variants in terms of these minimum percentages reveals almost no difference. Depending on the alliance combinations, the difference is either zero or is merely one point lower than that in the two-party variant. According to this criterion, it is not possible to prefer one to the other. Both variants offer almost the same opportunity for governmental stability.

## **3. Discrimination Between Parties**

When the two variants are examined in terms of single seats the parties get within the framework of scenarios set out in this study, the following observations can be made:

The multi-party variant is clearly more beneficial to FP. This is not very surprising because this variant would enable FP to run in the second round in a greater number of constituencies, as will be explained later. The second reason is that a party with low support at the level of second preferences clearly has a higher probability of winning in elections held with three candidates or more, than in those elections in which only two candidates are running and the winner is required to have an absolute majority.

On the other hand, the two-party variant is more beneficial to ANAP. This conclusion is true as far as ANAP continues to be the runner up and its second preference ranking remains high.

As regards to DYP, a clear preference is impossible. With the vote distribution of 1995, it would benefit from the multi-party variant if it formed an alliance with ANAP and from the two-party variant if it were in an alliance with FP. However, considering that DYP would maximise its vote in an alliance with ANAP, it might be concluded that it would prefer the multi-party variant.

For DSP, too, there is an uncertainty. In three of the five scenarios, DSP benefits more from the multi-party variant and in the remaining two from the two-party variant.

The multi-party variant is obviously to the advantage of CHP. Especially in a left-of-the-centre alliance, the distribution of seats between DSP and CHP would become more balanced in the multi-party variant.

The two-party variant would be more suitable for MHP, though this is somewhat debatable. In four of the five scenarios that have been tested, this party would get more seats in the two-party variant.

Obviously, when it comes to choosing between two different rules for the second round qualification, it is not possible to bring the parties to a full consensus. At a time when the two-round system is being seriously discussed by the parties, the consent of FP, DSP and even DYP would make it necessary to adopt the multi-party variant.

#### **4. Encouragement of Higher Turnout in the Second Round**

Turnout in the second round would be 76% to 81% in the two-party variant and 81% to 86% in the multi-party variant. The difference in favour of the first variant is not surprising. When three parties compete with each other in the second round in a large number of constituencies, the turnout would be higher. However, the difference is too low to justify the preference of one to the other.

Obviously, this comparison does not provide us with sufficient findings for making a clear choice. This study will, nevertheless, be based on the two-party variant. The main reason behind this choice is that the simulation model can be operated more reliably for this variant in terms of the second round distribution model. This is, therefore, a technical reason. We will later return to this subject, but let us again recall that the difference between the number of seats generated in the multi-party variant compared with the number of seats in the two-party variant is too small to affect qualitatively the outcomes.

One last point should be emphasised here: Turkey does not have any experience with the two-round electoral system, and it can be envisaged that the rule of having only two parties with the highest vote in the second round can be more appropriate for various reasons. For instance, it forces the electorate to make a choice between two-party coalitions. However, it must be stated that the rule that all candidates passing the constituency threshold qualifies for the second round will

not materially affect the expected result of the system. In other words, if a majority emerges in the Parliament in favour of the two-round electoral system, it will not be rational for the parties supporting that system to contribute to the transformation of a dispute on the two variants of the system into a confrontation that will hinder the adoption of the system.

## **2.3 Proportionally Reinforced Two-Round Electoral System**

The electoral system proposed for Turkey adds proportional reinforcement to the two-round system. 500 of the 550 MPs would be elected out of single districts according to the two-round system and the remaining 50 from a single national constituency according to the simple proportional system (the Hare quota plus the largest remainder formula). There is a number of reasons for this proportional reinforcement. Before going into details, it must be stated that this kind of mixed procedures are widely used in modern electoral systems. After having studied the election experiences of 27 stable democracies, political scientist Lijphart has most clearly proposed a two-tiered system to electoral system designers.<sup>11</sup> The reason why this kind of systems is called two-tiered is that they comprise single districts on the base and larger districts at the national or regional level.

The reasons for having a proportionally reinforced two-round system in Turkey are as follows:

1. The 50 seats to be determined at the national level will enable political parties to have experts MPs that they may want to benefit from. When the current electoral system is replaced by a single-district system, it will be more appropriate to have in the Parliament those experts who are not active politicians and therefore, are not known and have no support in the grassroots. Otherwise, they will not have a high chance of being elected.

2. The amended article 67 of the Constitution emphasises the principles of "fair representation" and "governmental stability". However, it is impossible to attain both at the same time. Therefore, this article is quite open to debate. Nevertheless, since proportional reinforcement effectively reduces the national threshold to 2% for 50 seats, the principle of "representation" will be served to some extent. If governmental stability is recognised as the first priority, proportional reinforcement must be kept limited.

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11 Lijphart Arend, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press, 1994.

3. Two-round single-district electoral systems suffer from a common weakness. Political parties are not encouraged to carry out political work in general and election campaigns in particular in those districts where they enjoy only a weak support among the electorate, since their chances of winning a seat in such districts are meagre. When the proportional reinforcement element is introduced to the system, parties will inevitably carry out activities in all districts, regardless of the level of support they enjoy in each because these 50 seats will be based on the nation-wide vote percentage.

Consequently, the electoral system model proposed for Turkey is "Proportionally Reinforced Single District" system. Under this system, 50 of the 550 seats would be allocated by proportional representation at the national level and 500 MPs would be elected from single district at the end of the first or second round. If no candidate received majority of votes in a constituency, a second round would be held in which two candidates with the highest votes would contest each other. The remaining part of this study will evaluate this system.

### **3. Evaluation of Proportionally Reinforced Two-Round System**

Our first evaluation will be concerned with the attainment of governmental stability, which is the main objective of this study. However, it is useful to evaluate the proposed system in connection with two more issues. The first of these will be to seek answers to the following questions: What is the likelihood of having a single party government under such a system and would a single party government give rise to problems of legitimacy because of its nation-wide vote percentage? The second concerns an investigation into the factors that would determine performance in the two-round system.

#### **3.1 Testing the Proposed Electoral System in Terms of Governmental Stability**

It was stated at the outset that the governmental stability would be more easily provided by a coalition comprising two parties that have agreed (at least in broad outlines) on a common programme. No doubt that political stability requires other conditions as well, including the prevention of corruption in politics, the improvement of the quality of the politicians, and the maturing of democratic culture within the society. However, the most important reason underlying the proposition of a two-round electoral system is the fact that two-party coalition governments would at least assure the necessary framework for and would facilitate the attainment of stability. When this proposition is accepted, it will be sufficient to investigate that system, which would make it more likely for a two-party coalition to have a majority in the Parliament. As such, we would be able to see if the two-round system would facilitate governmental stability more, compared to the current electoral system. In the first section, minimum vote percentages that six different two-party coalition combinations are required to receive in order to have the majority of seats in the Parliament under the current system have been calculated (see Table 1).

Now minimum vote percentages needed by the same coalition combinations to have a majority of seats will be calculated under the proportionally reinforced two-round system. This calculation is based on the two-party variant of the two-round system and the procedure of revealed preferences for vote distribution in the second round. It was shown in the second section that the required minimum vote percentages were only negligible between the multi-party and two-party variants.

**Table 2. Minimum Vote Percentages Needed by Two-Party Alliances for Having Absolute Majority in the Parliament**

	Current Electoral System (d'Hondt with threshold)		Number of seats	Proportionally reinforced two round system (Two parties variant)		Percentage vote at the first round of two round system (minus) Percentage vote under d'Hondt system
	1	2		3	4	
	Percentage vote	Number of seats		Percentage vote at the first round/ Percentage vote at the second round	Number of seats	
<b>Scenario 1</b> <u>ANAP – DSP Majority</u> FP-DYP-MHP CHP HADEP	46 %	278	36.5 % / 48.8 %	281	-9.5	
<b>Scenario 2</b> <u>ANAP – DYP Majority</u> FP-MHP CHP-DSP HADEP	44 %	286	35 % / 42%	286	-9.0	
<b>Scenario 3</b> <u>DSP – CHP Majority</u> ANAP-DYP FP-MHP HADEP	48 %	278	38 % / 49.7 %	284	-10.0	
<b>Scenario 4</b> <u>FP-ANAP Majority</u> DYP-MHP DSP-CHP HADEP	42 %	277	39 % / 47.2 %	281	-3.0	
<b>Scenario 5</b> <u>FP – DYP Majority</u> ANAP-DSP CHP HADEP MHP	42 %	277	39 % / 47.9 %	283	-3.0	
<b>Scenario 6</b> <u>FP-MHP Majority</u> ANAP-DYP DSP-CHP HADEP	42 %	276	41 % / 51.4 %	283	-1.0	

Table 2 shows a comparison of the vote percentages needed for the attainment of a majority by various two-party coalition combinations. The table envisages six combinations of two-party coalition governments. For each of these scenarios there are counter-alliances as indicated in the table. For example, an ANAP-DSP alliance (Scenario 1) would be countered by FP-DYP-MHP alliance while CHP and HADEP would run in the elections single-handedly. Against a DSP-CHP alliance (Scenario 3), FP-MHP and ANAP-DYP alliances would be formed. A final example: if FP and DYP formed an alliance (scenario 5), it would be contested by ANAP-DSP or DSP-CHP. It is interesting to note that when DSP-CHP and ANAP-MHP alliances are envisaged in this scenario, seat distribution remains unchanged under the same vote distribution.

These alliances are naturally peculiar to the two-round electoral system. The results under the current system, which are shown in the first column of Table 2, are merely nation-wide vote percentages and total seats of coalition parties in the absence of any alliances (and without merging votes). The vote percentages for the current system assume that 6 parties pass the national threshold.

These findings are very striking. The likelihood of coalition governments within and across the right-of-the-centre and the left-of-the-centre parties is much more higher under the proportionally reinforced two-round system than under the current electoral system. Let us discuss these scenarios one by one.

**Scenario 1** is on ANAP-DSP coalition. The vote distribution is designed on the basis of a 5-point difference between the two parties, as was the case in the 1995 elections. (For percentage of votes of the other parties, see Tables 1A and 2A). Under the current electoral system, ANAP and DSP combination would have a majority in the Parliament if each got 25.5% and 20.5%, respectively, and they jointly got 46%. Each would need to increase its vote percentage by 6 points over its 1995 vote percentage in order to reach this level. Such an extraordinary swing is simply impossible.

Under the two-round system, on the other hand, ANAP's and DSP's attaining a combined vote of 36.5% and forming an election alliance would be sufficient (see Table 2 A for the parties' percentage votes and seats). These two parties had a combined vote of 33% in the 1995 general elections (ANAP's vote of 19.7% less BBP's vote of 1.4 - in 1994 - plus the DSP vote). Thus, an increase of 3.5 points would be sufficient. Considering that a swing of 12% would be needed under the current system, the difference of 9.5 points marks out the distinction between "what is possible" and "what is impossible".

However, the seat distribution between ANAP and DSP would be very unbalanced (ANAP 225 seats, DSP 56 seats, see Table 2A). This is due to two main reasons. The first is the difference between their percentage of votes. When this difference is reduced to 1 point, DSP wins 32 more seats (to reach 88) and ANAP loses 40 (to drop to 185). In this case, the required minimum would rise by 1.5 points to 38%: ANAP 19.5% and DSP 18.5%. This brings us to the second reason: the factors that affect getting greater number of seats under the two-round system comprise a high rate of second preference votes and more homogenous vote distribution nation-wide. This subject will be taken up later. For the time being we will suffice with stating that ANAP is at a more advantageous position than DSP in terms of both factors.

**Table 2A. Vote and seat distributions for the Table 2 scenarios under the two-round system**

		FP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	HADEP	MHP
Scenario 1	Vote distribution	21.5	14.5	20.75	15.75	11	4	10.5
	Seat distribution	143	76	225	56	14	8	28
Scenario 2	Vote distribution	22.5	17.5	17.5	15	11	4	10.5
	Seat distribution	145	152	134	61	21	8	29
Scenario 3	Vote distribution	17	14.5	14.5	21	17	4	10.5
	Seat distribution	85	78	53	224	60	10	40
Scenario 4	Vote distribution	21	18	18	15	11	4	11
	Seat distribution	125	140	156	63	22	8	36
Scenario 5	Vote distribution	21.5	17.5	18.5	15	11	4	10.5
	Seat distribution	135	148	149	58	22	8	30
Scenario 6	Vote distribution	26	13	14	15	11	4	15
	Seat distribution	209	79	61	103	16	8	74

**Scenario 2** is that of an ANAP-DYP government. The minimum vote required under the current system would be 44%. These two parties had a combined vote of 37.5% in 1995 (after subtracting BBP's vote from ANAP's). There is no indication that they closed the gap of 6.5% during the last three years. It is obvious that they will not have a combined vote of 44% in the next general elections. Nevertheless, this right-of-the-centre coalition is the most feasible combination under the two-round system. What is required is as low as 35%. If these two parties ran in the elections in alliance under the two-round system, they would highly likely have a majority in the Parliament. The required percentage of votes is lower due to the two factors that have already been mentioned. These two parties seem to be at the most advantageous position both in terms of homogenous vote distribution nation-wide and their ranking as a second choice.

**Scenario 3** is that of a DSP-CHP government. Under the current system, these two parties would be required to have a combined vote of 48% in order to have a majority in the Parliament. Considering political identities, ideological tendencies and other characteristics of the Turkish electorate, it is obviously impossible for the left of the centre to reach that vote not only in the present, but also in the longer term. However, this minimum would drop to 38% in the two-round system, which is also impossible for the left-of-the-centre to attain considering its vote potential. However, there is no doubt that this system is the only chance for a left-of-the-centre government in the future. The left-of-the-centre attained the highest vote percentage in its history in 1977 when CHP got 42% of the votes. Therefore, 38% votes is not an impossible target for the left-of-the-centre. Furthermore, we can predict that the rise in the DSP and CHP votes (in terms of first preference) will be accompanied by a rise in their second preference votes. If this happens, the minimum vote that the left-of-the-centre is required to get will also drop.

Another aspect of this scenario that needs to be discussed is the unbalanced distribution of seats between DSP and CHP. CHP would get 60 seats as against DSP's 224 (Table 2A). As explained in connection with scenario 1, this is due to two main reasons. For one thing, DSP is assumed to be 4 points ahead of CHP. This is the difference that occurred in the 1995 elections. Secondly, DSP's second preference vote is 7.7% while CHP's is 5.3%. When CHP's vote percentage is raised to 21.5% and DSP's vote percentage is reduced to 17.5%, CHP would get 47 more seats and DSP would lose 53. Obviously, the difference between the number of seats would decline in that case, but DSP would have 64 more seats than CHP despite the latter's 4-point surplus (171 to 107). This inequality stems from the difference in their second preference votes. To put it in more concrete terms, the right-of-the-centre would tend to support DSP rather than CHP in the second

round. In this scenario, DSP and CHP would contest each other in 188 constituencies in the second round, of which most would be won by DSP. CHP must pursue a strategy that would help increase its second preference votes in order to have a more balanced distribution of seats at the left-of-the-centre.

**Scenario 4** (FP-ANAP coalition) and **Scenario 5** (FP-DYP coalition) can be discussed together. The common aspect of these scenarios is that a right-of-the-centre party forms a government with an Islamic fundamentalist party. The minimum vote required for either of these coalitions to have a majority is 42% for both variants under the current system, the lowest of all. Given the 1995 votes, this vote percentage is a very feasible one. It should be borne in mind that both scenarios assume MHP to have passed the threshold (Table 1 A, scenarios 4-1 and 5.1).

However, these two coalitions (except a FP-MHP coalition) would be those requiring the highest vote percentage under the two-round system. The minimum vote required would be 39% for both combinations. This is, of course, a very much attainable percentage. Judging on the basis of these two percentages only, it can be concluded that the two systems would make no difference for right-of-the-centre / Islamic fundamentalist coalitions. In fact, there is a very great qualitative difference between the two.

First, alliances would be formed before the elections in the two-round system, and voters, especially those of the right of the centre, would cast their votes knowing the existence of an alliance. This is very important for democratic legitimacy. Under the proportional d'Hondt system, each party gives the impression that it would form a government single-handedly and declares that it will exclude certain coalition alternatives in order to get the mainstream vote. However, after the elections, they could seek coalitions without considering tendencies of its voters. Obviously, this sort of behaviour is not legitimate and creates an environment that provokes undemocratic interventions.

Second, in both scenarios a right-of-the-centre party returns with the largest number of seats, although FP becomes the leading party, with a margin of 3 and 4 points at the first round (Table 2A). In a FP-ANAP alliance, ANAP would get 156 and FP 125 (despite a margin of 3 points) and in an FP-ANAP alliance DYP would get 148 seats and FP 135 (despite a margin of 4 points). This is another qualitative difference between the two-round system and the current system. This inequality is due to the difference between the second preference votes, as already mentioned. FP is the party with the lowest rate of second preference votes (except HADEP); its second preference vote is only 4.9%. ANAP's second preference vote

is 12.4% and DYP's 12.75%. Therefore, this inequality is not unjust, but is the result of the preference of the electorate. Since the two-round system is equipped with those mechanisms that go beyond the first preference votes and take other preferences into account as well, it can give results that are much closer to the social consensus. A right-of-the-centre / Islamic fundamentalist government to be formed under these conditions might not bring instability. As a matter of fact, voters of a right-of-the-centre party forming a coalition with the FP would cast their votes knowing this perspective. The dominant party of the coalition would be the right-of-the-centre party, and the Prime Minister would also be from this party. Furthermore, the democratic legitimacy of such a coalition would be unequivocal.

In addition, the Islamic fundamentalist party would be successful in the second round only if it increased its second preference vote. This incentive mechanism would require the party to adopt, or at least seek a sincere compromise with the principle of secularism that is embraced by most members of the society. Such a development would certainly be the greatest contribution to political stability in Turkey.

Finally, let us briefly touch upon **Scenario 6**, which is an FP-MHP alliance. Both systems would require the same vote percentage for a radical right-wing government, which is 42% and 41%. Such a possibility can arise in a situation where the right-of-the-centre collapses. Both electoral systems would be indifferent to such a development. The conditions under which the radical right-wing alliance would attain that vote percentage and political consequences of such a government are beyond the scope of this exercise.

The above vote percentages have been calculated assuming that six parties have passed the national threshold of 10%. It has been demonstrated in the first subsection that the required minimum vote would fall by a mere 2 points if one of these parties (MHP or CHP) failed to pass the threshold. In this case too, the two electoral systems would differ in terms of coalitions within and across the left-of-the-centre and the right-of-the-centre. These differences would fall from 9 - 10 points to 7 - 8 points (see Tables 1 and 2). When two parties failed to pass the threshold, the differences would significantly decline, although they would continue to exist. It should be noted however that this is not a desirable situation in terms of democracy and stability.

In the evaluation of the likelihood of two-party coalitions under the two-round system, one question to be posed is whether these coalitions would have such electoral support so as to avoid problems of legitimacy with minimum votes under 40%. Hence, the simulation model also calculates the turnout and vote percentages of

each party in the second round. The results are given in Table 2, column 3, under the designation of "second round vote percentage". Save one exception, the rates are about 50% and it is understood that there would be no problem of legitimacy. The only exception is an ANAP-DYP coalition. The second round vote percentage of that coalition is 42%. This low figure is directly associated with the 35% vote at the first round. When the first round vote of the right-of-the-centre rises to 36.5%, its second round vote would perform a considerable increase to 46%.

### 3.2 Single Party Government under Two-Round System

The second issue to be taken up in the evaluation of the proportionally reinforced two-round electoral system is the investigation of the likelihood of a single-party government under that system. For this purpose, some changes have been made in the design of the scenarios. It is assumed that one party gets stronger and, being aware of the opportunity of coming into power single-handedly, refuses to join any alliance. The other parties would run in the elections by forming the most advantageous alliances for themselves in order to prevent the strongest party to come to power. Table 3 reveals the minimum vote that each of the six parties is required to get in order to have a majority in the Parliament single-handedly as well as the other vote and seat distributions.

**Table 3 Minimum Vote Percentages Needed for Single Party Governments under Two Round System**

Single Party Governments		FP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	HADEP	MHP
ANAP	Vote percentage	20.5	14	24	14.5	10.5	4	10.5
	Number of seats	113	67	281	42	11	8	28
DYP	Vote percentage	20	24	14	14.5	10.5	4	11
	Number of seats	123	276	42	57	15	9	28
FP	Vote percentage	34.5	12	13.5	14.5	10.5	4	9
	Number of seats	284	70	50	96	23	7	20
DSP	Vote percentage	19	14	14	27	10	4	10
	Number of seats	117	61	39	281	13	9	30
CHP	Vote percentage	17.5	12	13	8	34.5	3	10
	Number of seats	109	50	49	22	280	8	32
MHP	Vote percentage	14	11.5	12	14.5	10.5	4	31.5
	Number of seats	39	48	43	112	19	11	278

A vote of 24% would be sufficient for an ANAP government. Becoming stronger, ANAP would run in the elections alone against FP-DYP-MHP and DSP-CHP alliances. In this case, ANAP would get 281 seats with a percentage of votes as low as 24% and would be able to form a government alone. The reason behind this outcome is that ANAP would contest in the second round in most of the districts and would get support from the right-wing voters against the left-of-the-centre and from the left-of-the-centre against FP. In this scenario, ANAP's second round vote rate is 41.5%. In the two-round system, this level of support is not sufficient. As already mentioned, electorate's support in the second round must preferably be around 50% and at least exceed 45%.

Almost the same conditions are required for DYP's coming to power alone. The minimum vote this party needs to get is also 24%. In this scenario, DYP comes to power alone against FP-MHP and ANAP-DSP alliances. DYP's second round vote percentage is even lower: 38.8%.

The situation is very different for a FP government. This party would be required to get no less than 34.5% of the vote in order to come into power individually. The alliances in the scenario are designed as ANAP-DYP-MHP and DSP-CHP. The percentage of FP votes in the second round is too high (48.7%) to give rise to any legitimacy debates. Under the current system, this party would form a government by itself if it got 35% of the vote. As is seen, the situation is the same for FP under both systems. This is important, because, contrary to certain allegations, the two-round system is not one designed to prevent FP from coming to power. To reiterate, the problem is that a party that has come out as the leading party in elections with the vote of a small minority (some 20%) is over-represented in the Parliament although it is opposed by the majority of the society-a situation which blocks the system. The two-round system is a means to help overcome this blockage within democratic rules.

Like the right-of-the-centre parties, DSP would be able to form a government individually with a relatively low percentage of votes, which is calculated as 27% by the model. The alliances against DSP are designed as FP-MHP and ANAP-DYP. The second round support of DSP is not sufficient either: 42.8%. This low percentage is due to the fact that DSP can get votes both from the right-of-the-centre and the left-of-the-centre in the second round. While DSP would need less than 30% under the two-round system it would need to get as high as 46% of the votes under the current system.

The case of CHP is similar to that of FP. CHP would need to get not less than 34.5% of the vote in order to have a majority. The alliances are as described in the previous paragraph. If CHP attained this level at the first round, it would have the support of an absolute majority in the second round with 51.3%. However, the minimum vote for CHP's coming to power would be 6 or 7 points lower than what is required under the current system.

MHP would need to get at least 31.5% in order to form a single-party government. It would be contested by ANAP-DYP and DSP-CHP alliances. The vote required in the second round would be 48.7%.

These experiments show that parties closer to the centre would be able to come to government with low vote percentages under a two-round system. Judging by this conclusion, it can be argued that the likelihood of securing governmental stability would increase. However, since the percentage of votes that ANAP, DYP or DSP would need to get at the second round remain low (turnout in the second round would be around 76% to 77%). Therefore, it should be borne in mind that a problem of legitimacy can arise. Nevertheless, this problem could be eliminated if minimum percentages of votes of these parties increase by 2 or 3 points.

Let us recall that the rule of 'two parties in the second round' has been chosen in our examination of single party governments. The results can be considered to be partly due to this rule. To test this assertion, the same experiments were conducted for the multi-party variant (with the same vote distribution and alliances). Minimum percentage votes would, in that case, increase by 3 points to 29% for ANAP and DYP, remain almost unchanged for FP or DYP and would drop by 1 point to 33.5% for CHP. These findings show that the multi-party variant would be a more appropriate choice under the two-round system unless one wishes to make it too easy for a centre-party to form a single-party government.

### **3.3 Factors of Success in Two-Round System**

As often stated in the interpretation of those experiments conducted for the purpose of evaluating two-round electoral system, changes in the number of seats won by the parties depends to a large extent on the proportional distribution of their second degree preference votes. It is possible to verify this fact by statistical methods. Another factor is the degree of homogeneity of the nation-wide votes of the parties.

An attempt was made to measure performance in the two-round system through the multiple regression method that uses second-degree preferential vote and its distribution over the country as independent variables. The measure for success

(dependent variable) is the minimum percentage votes required for single-party governments. These percentages may be assumed to have been purged of side effects that could be created by two-party alliances because they are calculated for each party individually and for a scenario in which the winner runs in elections without forming an alliance. A special numerical variable has been designed as an indicator of nation-wide diffusion. This variable is defined as the division of each party's standard deviation by its mean vote (SDEV / MEAN). The votes taken into account in this calculation are naturally the vote distribution in 500 individual districts in the 1995 elections. The values of this variable for each party are:

	FP/RP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	HADEP	MHP
MEAN	11,939	10,737	11,027	8,225	6,006	2,337	4,503
STANDARD DEVIATION	6,285	5,195	3,822	5,156	3,602	4,350	2,879
SDEV / MEAN	0.526	0.484	0.347	0.627	0.600	1.861	0.640

According to this variable, ANAP is the party with the most homogenous vote distribution nation-wide. It is followed by DYP. CHP is more diffused nation-wide than DSP. Conversely, DSP's regional vote concentration is higher than CHP. Among the six parties, MHP is the most regionally defined one. FP is somewhere in the middle. As expected, HADEP is a purely regional party. This party's standard deviation is almost twice as much the mean for the 500 districts.

The second independent variable is the second-degree preferential vote percentages as taken directly from VERİ A.Ş.'s May 1998 opinion poll. These percentages, without distributing the "undecided", are as follows.

	FP	DYP	ANAP	DSP	CHP	HADEP	MHP
Second choice vote percentage	0.049	0.127	0.124	0.077	0.053	0.003	0.068

Among the six main parties (excluding HADEP), DYP and ANAP enjoy the highest percentages by far. They are followed by DSP. The lowest rate belongs to FP. The worst rate after FP belongs to CHP. It is evident that HADEP is not only a regional party but also a marginal – extremist one.

To sum up, these two variables (the second-degree preferential vote and its nation-wide diffusion) explain almost entirely the performance in a two-round system:  $R^2 = 0.97$ . However, the extent of their effects is very different. The second-degree vote percentage produces an almost one-to-one effect (a one-point increase in the second-degree preference vote reduces the minimum percentage vote needed for coming to power by one point) nation-wide diffusion affects performance in a limited way. For example, a 10% improvement (drop) in the SDEV / MEAN ratio reduces the minimum vote required by 1.7 points. To translate these figures for FP, the diffusion measure of FP is required to drop from 0.526 to 0.395 if the vote percentage it needs to get for

coming to power declines to 33%. This implies that FP would need to be almost as diffused as ANAP. To attain the same degree of improvement, FP would need to increase its second preference votes from 4.9% to 6.4%.

A second procedure has also been used to test these findings. Given a seat and vote distribution, it has been investigated how a one-point increase in FP's and CHP's percentage votes would affect the seat distribution. For this purpose, it was assumed, without changing the distribution of the first preference votes, that some of those voters who are undecided about their second choice cast their second preference votes for FP first, and, in another scenario, for CHP. The number of these voters was chosen so as to increase the said parties' second preference votes by one-point.

It is observed that seats of FP and CHP increase directly with their second-preference votes.

These observations demonstrate that the two-round electoral system is equipped with a very strong mechanism that encourages parties to pursue political lines closer to the centre, that is, to social consensus. Not to mention its benefits in terms of governmental stability, the two-round system can be said to be a very important support to civil peace and hence, to democracy and stability under the current political circumstances of Turkey.

